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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
AND
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME 25 FEBRUARY, 1950 NUMBER 1
PREFERENCES AS AFFECTED BY SECTION 60c AND
SECTION 67b OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW
JOHN HANNA*
T HE GENERAL problem of preferences in bankruptcy in the recent
past has been more frequently and more comprehensively dis-
cussed in legal periodicals than any other bankruptcy topic.' It is not
the purpose of this article to supplement what has been written else-
where on the subject of Section 60a and b. The proper concern of
*Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
I The chief attack on Section 60a in its present form, whereby the test of a perfected
transfer is its validity against any creditor and any bona fide purchaser, is that the sec-
tion threatens to invalidate, if it does not, against the trustee security interests on inven-
tories, such as trust receipts, factor's liens, mortgages, or stocks of goods and condi-
tional sales for resale, which are not meant to be good against purchasers in due course
of business. The holding and the language of Corn Exchange Bank and Trust Co. v.
Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), and of In re Vardamaim, 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo.
1943), justify the most pessimistic conclusions. That some qualification is possible is
indicated by In re Rosen, 157 F.(2d) 997 (C.C.A. 3rd 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
835 (1947). In the Klauder case, where the assignee of accounts receivable was defeated
by the trustee because of the theoretical possibility in Pennsylvania at that time of the
obtaining of a priority by a bona fide second assignee, who first gave notice to the
account debtor, under the rule of Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (1828),
the Supreme Court could have held that it was not the bona fide purchase but the
additional action that determined the position of the second assignee, and hence that
the hypothetical bona fide purchaser test did not help the trustee. It is argued that
"buyer in regular course of business" means something different from "bona fide pur-
chaser,".and hence that the present law would not invalidate trust receipts and other
somewhat similar security interests, particularly when these are filed in accordance
with state law and hence not secret.
Following are some of the recent discussions of Section 60a:
Hearings before Bankruptcy Subcommittee of Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
2412 and H.R. 5834, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 (1948) ; Hearings before Bankruptcy
Subcommittee No. 2 of Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 272 and H.R. 2691, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949) ; Burman, Practical Aspects of Inventory and Receivables
Financing, 13 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 555 (1948) ; Hanna, Some Unsolved
Problems Under Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL. L. REv. 58 (1943);
Hanna, For'zvord to Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable: Confusion of the
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many members of Congress for the lamentable uncertainties of the
position of many secured creditors under the present law gives some
reason to hope that before this article appears an amendment to
Section 60a will have been adopted, which as to personal property
transfers will substitute a hypothetical lien creditor test for the exist-
ing hypothetical bona fide purchaser test in the preference section.
The wording of the amendment probably will vary considerably from
that heretofore so strongly urged by the American Bar Association's
special Committee, but the principal reform urged by the Bar Asso-
ciation will be accomplished.
The bill2 which apparently has the best chance of passage contains
an expression of policy condemning equitable liens in the following
language:
The recognition of equitable liens where available means of perfecting
legal or statutory liens have not been employed is hereby declared to be
contrary to the policy of this section.
This sentence is followed by other language stating that if any appli-
cable law requires a perfection against any third persons except pur-
chasers in regular course of business," the transfer shall not be deemed
Present Law, the Impact of the Bankruptcy Act, and the Need for Uniform Legisla-
tion, 33 CA.n. L. REv. 40 (1945) ; Hanna, Preferences in Bankruptcy, 15 U. OF CEL
L. REv. 311 (1948) ; Ireton, A Proposal to Amend Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act,A6 AM. BANxER REV. 257, 287 (1947) ; Keeffe, Kelly, and Lewis, Sick Sixty: A Pro-posed Revision of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 CORN. L. Q. 99 (1947);Kupfer, Progress in the Amendment of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 13 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 624 (1948) ; Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange
National Bank and Trust Company v. Klauder Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Impli-
cations, 32 VA. L. Rxv. 910 (1946); Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange NationalBank and Trust Company v. Klader Revisited: A Supplemental Note, 33 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1947).
Livingston and Kearns, Commercial Financing and the Relation Between Secured
and Unsecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 13 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 609(1948) ; Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS, 687 (1948); Lowenstein, Assignments of Accounts Receivable and the
Bankruptcy Act, 1 RuTGaas U. L. REv. 1 (1947); McGowan, Trust Receipts Under
Section 60a, CREDIT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, February, 1948, p. 4; McGowan,
Assignability of Documentary Credits, 13 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 666(1948); MacLachlan, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L. REv. 233(1946) ; Martin, Substantive Regulation of Security Devices Under the Bankruptcy
Power, 48 COL. L. REV. 62 (1948); Moore and Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amend-
ments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L. J. 683, 686-692 (1948) ; Oglebay,
Proposed Revision of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act: A Step Backward, 51 CoM.
L. J. 263 (1946) ; Pemberton, Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts Receivable,
13 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 643 (1948) ; Silverman, Factoring: Its Legal
Aspects and Economic Justification, 13 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 598
(1948).
2H.R. 2691.
3 "The recognition of equitable liens where available means of perfecting legal or
statutory liens have not been employed is hereby declared to be contrary to the policy
of this section. If (A) a transfer is for security and applicable law requires a signed
and delivered writing, or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like
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to have been completed until such perfection occurs, even if the action
of the parties is sufficient against persons obtaining a lien by legal or
equitable proceedings.
The amendment also retains the test of perfection against bona fide
purchasers in respect of real estate transfers.,
The blanket condemnation of equitable liens and the insistence on
the retention of the bona fide test for real estate transactions reflect
the opinion of a majority of the members of the National Bankruptcy
Conference that it is a desirable function of the Bankruptcy Act to
attempt to alter state rules of property and contract in order to enlarge
the interests of unsecured creditors. Since the bankruptcy court is a
court of equity, the position of Congress in announcing a policy deter-
mination hostile to equitable liens is somewhat anomalous. Several
writers in referring to equitable liens have contrived an epithet by the
use of quotation marks in the expression "judge-made" liens. Equitable
liens are nothing more than interests recognized by equity judges. In
expressing a judgment as to what is fair and equitable, judges are
exercising their historic function of doing justice by supplementing
legal rules. Why liens approved as equitable in particular situations
should receive the blanket condemnation of Congress is puzzling. That
such interests prevail at all in state law is at least some indication that
they are also approved by the legislatures which have the power to
change them. In fact, by Section 67b the states may still have the
power to preserve any of these equitable liens by giving them a
statutory status.
The reason generally assigned for the assault against equitable liens
is that they are secret. Ignoring the question as to the truth of this
assertion for the moment, one may inquire whether it is the business
of Congress or the several states to determine whether the claim of a
litigant to the protection of a court of equity necessarily should be
denied merely because he has not given public notoriety to his claim
overt action as a condition to its full validity'against third persons other than a buyer
in the ordinary course of trade and if (B) such overt action has not been taken, such
transfer is not perfected within the meaning of this paragraph (2). Notwithstanding
the first sentence of this paragraph (2), it shall not suffice to perfect such transfer that
it is made for a valuable consideration and that both parties intend to perfect it and
that they take action sufficient to effect a transfer as against liens by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple bontract: Provided, however, That where the debtor's own
interest is only equitable, he can perfect a transfer thereof by any means appropriate
fully to transfer an interest of that character." (H.R. 2691, p. 4.)
"A transfer of real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered when
it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchase from the debtor could create
rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee." (H.R. 2691, p. 2.)
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or has not conducted his affairs in some different way which would
have given him a different sort of property interest. It may well be
that his claim is for assets which have swelled a respondent's estate in
such circumstances that it would bd grossly unfair to add them to the
resources subject to the claim of other creditors. The comprehensive
charge of secrecy against equitable liens, however, cannot be sup-
ported. Not only is there general publicity for certain types of equi-
table interests, but the very fact of the recognition of equitable inter-
ests in many particular cases involves a finding that the adverse claim-
ant has notice of the equitable claim. One must remember that the
Bankruptcy Act in its preference sections, by adopting any hypo-
thetical test of perfection of a transfer, gives the trustee a position
that may be much superior to that of some or even all of the creditors
he represents. It is at least theoretically possible that where a debtor
had obtained real estate by fraud, and his victim had only an equitable
lien for its restoration, every single creditor may have been aware of
the fraud before he became a creditor. Nevertheless, the trustee would
acquire the bankrupt's interest free of the equitable claims and would
distribute its proceeds ratably to all the creditors.
Secret security interests of creditors of large corporations can
scarcely exist irrespective of compliance with recording statutes. Sup-
pose, for example, a debenture issue or term loan agreement contained
a provision by which the corporate debtor agreed that no subsequent
borrowing should be secured, or, if secured, that the previous unse-
cured loans should be likewise secured. While the authority is scant, it is
at least possible that an equitable interest in the debtor's property is
created on behalf of the first creditors. It is unlikely that this contract is
recorded. On the other hand, the contract is almost certainly known to
everyone dealing with the corporation on any substantial scale. Any de-
benture issue is likely registered with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. The main points of the contract are reported in numerous in-
vestment services. To say that whatever equitable security interest may
exist should be nullified in any bankruptcy of the debtor as a result of a
doctrinaire provision regarding preferences seems to be defeating
rather than doing justice. The law of security, in addition to consisting
of specialized rules of property and contracts, is made up of rules of
equity which supplement, modify or supersede the bargains made by
parties. In numerous cases the interests protected are in the category
of equitable liens. To take one illustration from suretyship: where the
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surety has guaranteed the performance of a contractor, the surety
probably has an equitable lien on amounts due from the owner. If the
contractor defaults and the surety performs, the amount due should be
paid to the surety, subject to certain exceptions. Such an interest in
the surety is generally not the subject of record, but it is rarely secret,
for one can scarcely be a creditor of the contractor without knowing
of the suretyship contract.
The introduction into the bankruptcy law of reference to equitable
liens is unfortunate because the term "lien" is one of the most amor-
phous concepts in law.' The Restatement of Security refers to the
word "lien" in the following language:
The term "lien" is frequently used in the broad sense of a tie or hold
which one person has for the purpose of security upon land, chattels or
intangibles in which another has an interest. A lien in this broad sense may
5 The word "lien" is derived from Latin through French and means to "tie" or
"bind." It signifies a claim attaching to property without satisfying which the owner
cannot have a clear title. In other words, it is a charge, enforceable either in law or
equity, against identifiable personality or realty. In the broadest sense it includes all
security interests, both legal and equitable. Mr. Justice Erle once observed that "the
words equitable lien are intensely undefined." Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 El. & El. 19, 121
Eng. Rep. 8 (1859). See JoNEs, LiENs 26 (3rd ed. 1914). Jones remarks that while
equitable liens have been regarded as having their origin in trusts, they are better
described as analogous to trusts. In security an equitable lien arises when equity will
give specific performance of a contract for security. An equitable security lien or a
constructive trust will also be recognized when a remedy for a wrong can be afforded
by recognizing a property interest in behalf of the wronged party.
Among the best known equitable liens are those for vendor and vendee in real estate
transactions, and where there has been a contract to give a mortgage. An illustration
of an equitable lien as the result of a wrong would be one allowed against property
improved by money obtained by larceny and embezzlement. None of these liens would
be good against a bona fide purchaser, but in many states they would be valid against
a judgment creditor. While one probably could not assert effectively that the victim
of a wrong could have obtained other security, this qualification in the proposed draft
of the amendment to Section 60a would not affect the bona fide purchaser test.
The vendor's lien is recognized in between one-third and one-fourth of the states to
give a seller of real estate a lien for the unpaid purchase price after transfer of title.
Such a situation can arise when the expectation of the vendor is that he will be paid in
full in a short time. In states recognizing vendor's liens, a lien for a vendee usually is
also enforceable. This is invoked, for example, where a vendee has paid part of the
purchase price and the vendor either cannot or will not transfer the real estate covered
by the deed or contract.
A possible unfair application of the bona fide purchaser test in respect of an agree-
ment to give a mortgage could occur in several ways, where the lien arising from such
an agreement was good against creditors but not against bona fide purchasers. The
creditors might all know of the transaction. Even if they did not know, the transaction
might not have changed their position in any way. For example, a man in business in
Seattle might arrange to buy a summer home at some distant point. He could agree
with a lending agency that if the latter would advance the final payment to the seller,
he would execute a mortgage as soon as title was transferred. The money is advanced
and title transferred to the buyer. Then either the buyer refuses to execute the mort-
gage, or there is some delay in the execution and the buyer becomes bankrupt in the
interval. Even if the buyer executed the mortgage after the delay but before bank-
ruptcy, the mortgage might be considered a preference as security for an antecedent
debt. The result in bankruptcy would be that the proceeds of the real estate would go
to all the creditors with no priority to the creditor who created the asset.
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also be defined as a charge. Thus broadly understood "lien" may be con-
sidered as a general term embracing all sorts of security devices, legal or
equitable.
The term "possessory lien" is not used in this Chapter in the broad sense
just mentioned but in a narrow sense which makes it one of the most lim-
ited, if not the most limited, of security interests. The possessory lien is an
interest only in chattels. It is somewhat like a pledge but the powers of the
lienor are generally less than those of the pledgee.'
In the sense just used "lien" of course does not mean the common law
possessory lien which is the privilege of a bailee to retain a chattel, not
bailed for the purpose of security, until some demand of the bailee
against the bailor has been satisfied.7 The typical possessory lien is
that of the artisan who has done work on a chattel at the request of
the bailor.'
The intrusion of a diatribe against equitable liens in the Bankruptcy
Act does not reach any recognized evil. It satisfies no public demand
for a variation in property rights in bankruptcy as distinguished from
state law. There is no evidence either from statistics or in the opinion
of bankruptcy experts that the acceptance in bankruptcy of equitable
interests has ever had any significant effect on general creditors. The
cases most criticized under the old interpretation of Section 60, with
the exception of Sexton v. Kdssler and Company,' where the agreement
for the pledge probably constituted an equitable interest, were cases
of unrecorded legal interests where the bankruptcy courts were dis-
regarding the policy of state laws. The rules of these cases, as well as
that of Sexton v. Kessler, have been changed by the proposed amend-
ments to the Chandler Act just as effectively as by the present wording
of the Chandler Act itself. The hostility expressed toward equitable
liens in the proposed new draft of Section 60 is due in part to a determi-
nation to enlarge estates for the benefit of general creditors, with little
6 RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, SCOPE NOTE 157.
7 RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, § 59: "Where a bailee has the privilege of retaining a
chattel, not bailed for the purpose of securing the payment of a debt or the performance
of some other act by the bailor, until some demand of the bailee against the bailor has
been satisfied, the interest of the bailee is a possessory lien."
8 One effect, not necessarily undesirable, of recent amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act may be to encourage informal settlements between creditors and debtors without
any sort of court supervision. The Board of Trade of San Francisco settled 527 cases
of embarrassed debtors between April 1, 1947, and April 1, 1948, and used bankruptcy
in only two of them (1948 Report, Board of Trade, 15). Although the existence of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the laws under which it operates, are not
the entire explanation, it is interesting to observe the tendency toward corporate
financing by term loans and private placement of securities since the passage of the
Securities Act.
9 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
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consideration for justice in particular cases, and in part to theoretical
assumptions about secrecy and equitable liens.
The best that can be said for the new wording is that the amend-
ments do remedy the worst defects of the present law and remove the
uncertainty about security transactions in connection with inventory
financing. It is true that the economic importance of these reforms
greatly outweighs that of the occasional unrecorded interests in real
estate and equitable interests in land and chattels. The larger trans-
actions in real estate, especially where corporations are concerned, are
completely supervised at all stages by experienced lawyers. Compli-
ance with recording requirements is generally complete. These trans-
actions scarcely present a problem for the bankruptcy courts. A con-
siderable part of the more intricate real estate controversies are settled
in probate administration. In the matter of rural real estate, the farmer
can stay out of the bankruptcy court entirely if he wishes, and in any
event Congress will probably continue some legislation along the lines
of Section 75. In practice the provisions of Section 60a touching real
estate will be invoked only in isolated cases. One might argue that this
is an argument for omitting such real estate provisions rather than
retaining them as an interference with state law and affording the
possibility of injustice in particular cases.
Anyone familiar with the procedure in bringing about federal legis-
lation can understand readily why those interested in inventory financ-
ing are willing to compromise with those to whom it is an article of
faith that the general creditor should be favored in the bankruptcy
laws. Financing agencies that provide working capital to debtors are
not concerned with real estate. If they gain their own commendable
objectives they have no inclination to enter the lists on behalf of other
classes of creditors. Bankruptcy presents highly technical problems.
Even conscientious members of Congress, unless as lawyers they have
had experience in bankruptcy courts, are scarcely in a position to pass
upon the details of proposed amendments. The members of the* judi-
ciary subcommittees, especially those who have attended hearings, are
better prepared, but even they can be puzzled by conflicting views.
Bankruptcy bills have no political significance. The result is that unless
organizations and individuals whose position is respected present a
substantially unanimous front, it is difficult to get a bankruptcy bill
reported favorably by the judiciary committees. Furthermore, even a
favorable report will not necessarily ensure the passage of a bill if an
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
influential Senator or Representative requests a delay for further study
and inquiry. For these reasons the draftsmen of any amendment are
apt to yield to various additions and compromises so long as their main
objective is not endangered. In the case of the amendment to Section
60a, some of the members of the American Bar Association Committee
are doubtful about the retention of the bona fide purchaser test for
real estate transfers and feel that the condemnation of equitable liens
is unnecessary and undesirable. On the other hand, they realize that
the proponents of these provisions probably have enough influence to
delay if not defeat the amendments which are the chief interest of the
committee.
Section 60c
The possible disastrous applications of Section 60a of the Chandler
Act since the Supreme Court decision in Corn Exchange Bank v.
Klauder ° has led to considerable study as to the mitigating effects of
other sections. One suggestion has been that if a creditor makes an
advance against security which because of lack of perfection is a void-
able preference, and thereafter makes other advances intended to be
similarly secured, he can set off all subsequent advances against the
value of the security. Suppose, for example, in a state following the
rule of Dearie v. Hall"° a creditor makes an advance of $10,000 against
$50,000 in assigned accounts. He thereafter makes a further advance
of $30,000, nominally against the same security. Between this latter
date and bankruptcy he discovers that the debtor is insolvent. The
security is in fact never perfected and is deemed to have been per-
fected immediately before bankruptcy. Under the rule of the Klauder
case there is a voidable preference and the trustee can recover the
assigned accounts or their proceeds. Can the creditor require a sub-
traction of $30,000 as a setoff?
Section 60c of the Chandler Act, unchanged since its original enact-
ment in 1898, reads as follows:
If a creditor has been preferred, and afterward in good faith gives the
debtor further credit without security of any kind for property which
becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such new credit remain-
ing unpaid at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off
against the anlount which would otherwise be recoverable from him.
The meaning of this subsection must be sought in part at least in its
10 Supra note 1.
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history. Prior to 19031" Section 57g as interpreted by the Supreme
Court required a secured creditor who had been preferred, even if the
preference was not voidable, to surrender the preference if his claim
was to be allowed. 2 To alleviate the harshness of this rule, in addition
to such setoffs as might be allowed under Section 60c the bankruptcy
courts adopted the so-called "net result" rule for running accounts.
Where payments were made in the regular course of business within
four months of bankruptcy but other goods were sold in good faith
without knowledge of insolvency, so that the net result was to enlarge
the bankrupt's estate, the payments received within four months had
no preferential effect." Since the amendment of Section 57g to require
the surrender of voidable preferences only, the net-result rule may be
regarded as obsolete. Even if Section 60c is designed to accomplish
some of the same ends as the net-result rule, it is not necessary to have
a running account to invoke Section 60c, which can apply to isolated
transactions. The present law, as is stated by Collier," is that there is
neither a duty to surrender under Section 57g nor a right of setoff
under 60c unless the preference is voidable.
One point of interpretation of Section 60c may be confidently con-
cluded at the outset. It is not necessary for the setoff claimant to show
that the asset he transferred became a part of the bankrupt estate.
Congress said "debtor's" estate, not "bankrupt's" estate. Had it meant
that the asset must be available to the trustee, it could have used the
latter term or some such phrase as "debtor's estate passing to the
trustee."'
It should be noted next that Section 60c requires that the creditor
to be entitled to a setoff have acted in good faith. In Kaufman v. Tred-
way, Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the court, said:
"1 Act of February 5, 1903, 32 STAT. 797.
22 Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438 (1901).
See also 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, §§ 57.19 and 60.67 (14th ed. 1941 and supp.). But
see Willcox v. Goess, 92 F.(2d) 8 (C.C.A. 2d 1937), cert. de., 303 U.S. 647 (1938);
Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (C.C.A. 5th 1924).
'a Jacquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78 (1902) ; Yaple v. Dahl-Millakan Grocery Co., 193
U.S. 526 (1904).
"43 COLLIER 251 (14th ed.).
' The problem of setoff of mutual debts and credits under Section 68 is in practice
chiefly of importance between banks and their depositors.
16 Kaufman v. Tredway, 195 U.S. 271 (1904). The trial court held that the claimant
must show either that the money or property in question remain in the debtor's estate
until bankruptcy, or that it is used to pay creditors entitled to priority. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention. The Court pointed out that to make the creditor show the
disposition of the property by the debtor would defeat in many cases the purposes of
the subsection.
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Further, Congress provided that the creditor act in good faith. Thus it
excluded any arrangement by which the creditor, seeking to escape the
liability occasioned by the preference he has received, passes money or
property over to the debtor with a view to its secretion until after the bank-
ruptcy proceedings have terminated, or with some other wrongful purpose.
It meant that the creditor should not act in such a way as to intentionally
defeat the bankrupt act, but should let the debtor have the money or prop-
erty for some honest purpose. Requiring that it should become a part of the
debtor's estate excluded cases in which the creditor delivered the property
to a third person on the credit of the debtor, or delivered it to him with
instructions to pass it on to some third party. The purpose was that the
property which passed from the creditor should in fact become a part of the
debtor's estate, and that the credit should be only for such property.17
While the learned Justice condemned an intentional act to defeat the
Bankruptcy Act, the context shows he was thinking of collusion be-
tween debtor and creditor or other conduct intended to deplete the
estate. It does not follow that acts done with the purpose of avoiding
the technical application of rules of preference when the creditor is
fairly contributing to the enlargement of the estate are forbidden by
the good faith requirement.
The subsection also niakes clear that the claim to be set off must be
without security.
The simple theory of the subsection is that if a creditor once depletes
the bankrupt estate by taking a preference and later adds assets to the
debtor, the latter can be balanced against what he would otherwise
have to return. 8
The suggestion that Section 60c can be interpreted to change the
effect of Section 60a of the Chandler Act in its present form does not
seem warranted by the words of Section 60c nor by the decisions under
it. If, for example, as in the illustration originally stated, a creditor
advances a small sum against a large security which is not perfected in
accordance with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act, subsequent
advances are made either with or without security. If without security,
they can be set off not against the whole value of the security but
against the security interest which is set aside as a preference. If a
debt of $5,000 is secured by a pledge of $20,000, the security interest
in the creditor is $5,000. The balance is the debtor's. It does not need
17 Id. at 274. See 4A REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, § 1719 (5th ed. 1943).
Is Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (C.C.A. 5th 1924) ; In re Evansville Brown Co.,
29 F. (2d) 643 (C.C.A. 7th 1928) ; Rogers v. American Halibut Co., 216 Mass. 227,
103 N.E. 689 (1913) ; Talty v. Ross, 14 F.(2d) 240 (D. Mass. 1926) ; In re Morrow,
134 F. 686 (1901); In re Bailey, 110 F. 928 (D. Vt., 1901).
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the aid of the preference section for the trustee to recover $15,000.
If the creditor advances $15,000 after the preference without security,
the net security recoverable by the trustee is $15,000, that is, he recov-
ers $5,000 on the first preference, but the creditor can set off against
that $5,000 of the subsequent advances. The creditor can thus gain
no advantage by making subsequent advances. If the new advances
are secured by the original security, the mere fact that these are also
technical preferences, and can be set aside, does not justify the con-
clusion that the second advances are made without security. Between
the parties there is security. Any other interpretation which would let
the creditor set off $15,000 against the total value of the security would
make the perfection rules of preference meaningless. The result of an
original advance of $5,000 secured by an unperfected transfer of
$20,000 in security, followed by $15,000 against the same security,
would be that the trustee could set aside the entire security interest of
the creditor as a preference, assuming that the security was not per-
fected within four months of bankruptcy against a bona fide purchaser
and that the other conditions for avoiding a preference under Section
60b were present.
Section 67b
Section 67b is new in the Chandler Act, but is a re-enactment of
Section 67d' and a restatement of the principles of decisions under it.
Section 67b reads as follows:
The provisions of section 60 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding,
statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords, or
other classes of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing to the
United States or any State or subdivision thereof, created or recognized by
the laws of the United States or of any State, may be valid against the
trustee, even though arising or perfected while the debtor is insolvent and
within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or of
the original petition under chapter X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act, by or
against him. Where by such laws such liens are required to be perfected
and arise but are not perfected before bankruptcy, they may nevertheless
be valid, if perfected within the time permitted by and in accordance with
29 § 67d: "Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in
fraud upon this Act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded accord-
ing to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall, to the
extent of such present consideration only, not be affected by this Act."
See, e.g., Courtney v. Fidelity Trust Co., 219 F. 57 (C.C.A. 6th 1914) ; Martin v.
Orgain, 174 F. 772 (C.C.A. 5th 1909); It re New York-Broolyn Fuel Corp., 11
F. (2d) 802 (C.C.A. 2nd 1926) ; Sholseth v. Bergen Mfg. Co., 56 S.D. 112, 227 N.W.
483 (1929).
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the requirements of such laws, except that if such laws require the liens to
be perfected by the seizure of property, they shall instead be perfected by
filing notice thereof with the court.
The subsection poses several interesting problems which are not
considered in this discussion. These include the basic question as to
how far the bankruptcy court is bound by state law as to the nature of
a lien recognized by the state, and the frequent controversy as to
whether applicable law has established a priority or a lien.2" It is obvi-
ous that if a valid lien exists, a proceeding to enforce it by court help
will not give rise to a voidable lien by legal proceedings.
The expression "recognized" in the phrase "statutory lien created
or recognized" seems to refer to the lien consequences of certain statu-
tory provisions, although a lien is not in terms given by statute. Thus
a statute may provide that a levying officer's fees shall be paid out of
the proceeds of a sale on execution and this is construed as fixing
a lien.'
Since this article is primarily concerned with the possible effect of
Section 67b on the application of Section 60a to certain forms of
security, particularly those on inventory, what is here considered is
the scope of the words "statutory liens." It is obvious that if trust
receipts and factors' liens, or for that matter conditional sales and
chattel and real estate mortgages, are statutory liens, they may be valid
in spite of Section 60a. Section 67b requires no perfection against bona
fide purchasers but only against the position of the trustee as of the
date of the petition. This means that any statutory lien is valid against
20 Manley v. Hood, 37 F. (2d) 212 (C.C.A. 4th 1930) ; Halpert v. Industrial Comm.
of N.Y., 147 F.(2d) 375 (C.C.A. 2d 1945). See also Note, 51 YALE L. J. 863 (1942).
21 In re Famous Furniture Co., 42 F. (2d) 777 (E.D., N.Y., 1942). "Recognized"
may also be significant as indicating that if a state court or other non-bankruptcy court
has "recognized," that is, decided, that the effect of a state or other statute is to create
a lien, this determination should not be questioned by the bankruptcy court. The bank-
ruptcy court presumably would still have jurisdiction to define the term "statutory
lien," much as it may define "banking corporation" and "insurance corporation,"
although the influence of the state attitude would be considerable. For example, if a
state regarded a trust company as a banking corporation, the bankruptcy court would
likely follow the state's viewpoint. If the state said a laundry company was a banking
corporation, or a single partnership for insurance risks was an insurance corporation,
the bankruptcy court would be likely to disagree. The editors of COLLER suggest that
the distinction in Section 67b is between liens recognized by statute and "judge-made"
liens, by which they understand liens recognized by equity courts merely because the
parties have contracted for them. 3 COLLIER, § 60.47 (14th ed.). If this is true, the term
"statutory lien" may have a broad definition indeed. Cf. Boteler v. Ingalls, 308 U.S.
57, 521, 637 (1939). See also In re 671 Prospect Ave. Holding Corp., 105 F.(2d) 960
(C.C.A. 2d 1939).
Since Section 67 refers specifically to liens acqired in legal proceedings, although
these are at least in part statutory, it is obvious such liens are not included in the term
"statutory."
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the trustee if as to property in the possession and control of the bank-
rupt at the date of the petition the lienor would have prevailed against
a judgment creditor, and as to property not in his possession, against
a creditor with an execution returned unsatisfied.2
Three concepts of statutory lien may be considered. It may mean
(and this is suggested by the context when employees, contractors,
mechanics and landlords are specified) that in addition to tax liens, the
only liens covered by the term are those to which a party becomes
entitled without any further action on his part to obtain the lien. He
must be in the relationship out of which the lien arises and presumably
he could waive the lien, but so long as he conforms to certain condi-
tions of the relationship, he need do nothing more to become a lienor.
Thus a material man who supplies gravel for a construction project
usually has a mechanic's lien of some sort merely because he con-
tributes the material for the building. Furthermore, this lien did not
exist at common law. It is wholly the creature of the statute.
A second possible meaning of statutory lien is that in addition to the
liens described in the foregoing paragraph it includes all liens made
legal by statute, whereas without the statute they would only be equi-
table liens. In other words, if the common law recognized. a lien in
favor of a party who, by contract or otherwise, became entitled to it,
this is not a statutory lien. If the parties by contract could formerly
give a lienor only an equitable interest but the statute now gives him
a legal interest, there is a statutory lien. An agreement to pledge with-
out delivery of the pledged chattel creates an equitable lien in the
promisee. If a statute should call this a legal interest, with the varied
priority consequences of such an enactment, the intended pledgee
would have a statutory lien.
An excellent example of the sort of lien that would be called statu-
tory under this conception is the modern factor's lien as created by
statute in New York and elsewhere.2" The factor contracts .for his lien
but he obtains a legal lien if he conforms with the statute, whereas
formerly at common law no lien would have arisen.
2
'
22 An agister would likely be in the same category. By the common law as inter-
preted in most states, he had no lien. Today he usually has a lien by statute. For
example, one who feeds cattle has a lien for their feeding. The mere fact that this lien
also requires a retention of possession, which is not a common characteristic of statu-
tory liens, does not seem enough to take the agister's lien out of the stafutory class.
23 N.Y. PEas. Paop. LAw, § 45.
24 It is probably unnecessary to mention to lawyers that the modern factor often has
no resemblance to the common-law factor or commission merchant. The modem factor
is a financing agency, not a selling agent. The statutory landlord's lien has a common-
law background.
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In this connection it may be well to ask if the draftsman of the
Chandler Act had any thought of the distinction sometimes made
between "title" security and "lien" security. As everyone knows, the
original notion of the real estate mortgage was that it was the convey-
ance of an estate, usually the fee, on condition. The chattel mortgage
was a conveyance of ownership, with an obligation to reconvey when
the security purpose was satisfied. A conditional sale is the retention of
ownership for purposes of security. In most states the modern real
estate mortgage is a lien defined by statute. In a somewhat lesser num-
ber of states, the same thing is true of the chattel mortgage. In a few
states the lien aspects of the conditional sale are recognized.
A third possible definition of statutory lien is that it means any lien
which is defined and regulated by statute, whether or not such a lien
was recognized at common law." If it be objected that such an inter-
pretation would greatly restrict the application of Section 60a and b,
it may be noted that Section 67b obviously intends some degree of miti-
gation of the preference section. What that degree is should be found
in the words of the statute.
The judicial authority is meager and scarcely justifies any dogmatic
assertions as to the scope of statutory liens. On the whole it points in
the direction of a fairly broad interpretation. It seems to support the
contention I have made elsewhere, that at least factor's liens of the
sort allowed by New York law, and trust receipts"0 are statutory liens.
It seems not unlikely that other security interests may come within the
same category."
Commercial Credit Company v. Davidson" involved a claim against
a trustee in bankruptcy for a purchase money lien on personal property
in the hands of the first purchaser at the date of his bankruptcy. The
Mississippi statute gives the vendor a lien while the chattel sold
remains in the hands of the first purchaser or of one deriving title
through him with notice that the purchase money was unpaid.2" The
lien was obviously not perfected against a bona fide purchaser. The
25 If this idea were rejected generally it might still be accepted in part. For example,
a state may have held that a conditional sale of goods for resale or a chittel mortgage
on a stock of goods was illegal as a fraudulent conveyance. Then a statute is passed
making such floating charges on inventory good under certain conditions. Has the state
now created a statutory "lien"?
26 The Supreme Court of California classifies trust receipts as creating a lien.
Prima v. Bank of Italy, 194 Cal. 195, 225 Pac. 441 (1924). Certainly if the trust receipt
is a lien as distinguished from title security, it is a statutory lien.
27 See In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Ky. 1943). The actual decision
involved a surety's equitable lien on retained percentages.
28 112 F.(2d) 54 (C.C.A. 5th 1940).
29 § 2239, Miss. CODE (1930).
SECTIONS 60c AND 67b OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held it good against the trustee. C. J.
Holmes said :30 "The lien relied on here is not contractual...; it arose
solely by virtue of the Mississippi statute."'"
A decision which, in the opinion stating it, seems to adopt a gener-
ous interpretation of the scope of Section 67b, is White v. Karl Kiefer
Machine Co. 2 Under Missouri law a conditional seller could treat the
unpaid purchase price as a lien upon the chattel sold, notwithstanding
the reservation of title. The conditional sale contract was properly
filed, so that the actual decision is only one that a lien obtained by
judicial action to enforce a prior valid lien is not nullified by Section
67a. Judge Reeves expressly characterized the Missouri unpaid seller's
lien as a statutory lien: "Accordingly," he said,"8 "the vendor would
have a right to perfect his lien, even within four months of bank-
ruptcy."
On the interesting and important question of the trust receipt as a
statutory lien, Judge Yankwich,3' after referring to several other statu-
tory liens, said: "An example of such lien, recognized by a Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under California law, is the
so-called 'trust receipt' created under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
of California.""8
The Chandler Act of 1935 has not had a long history, and much of
its short life has been during a period when bankruptcy cases were not
numerous. We may well expect further decisions relating to the pro-
visions of Section 60c and Section 67b. That the latter section is a
more important qualification of the former than has been yet recog-
nized is likely. What one can say with assurance is that, as the law
now stands, the states can do much to nullify the application of Sec-
tion 60a simply by naming creditors' interests statutory liens. What
the reaction of the draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Act would be to such
a policy is another problem.
30 112 F.(2d) 54, 57 (C.C.A. 5th 1940).
81 While a lien acquired by legal proceedings which merely enforces a statutory
lien is not nullified by Section 67a, a nice question is whether the same result follows
when the lien by judicial proceedings is for the enforcement of an equitable lien. For a
holding that the second lien prevails against the trustee, see Mulhern v. Albin, 163
F.(2d) 41 (C.C.A. 8th 1947).
32 127 F.(2d) 119 (C.C.A. 8th 1942).
asId at 120. Cf. Clark, J., In re 671 Prospect Ave. Holding Corp., 105 F. (2d) 960,
961 (C.C.A. 2nd 1939): "This [question of lien on chattels under real estate mort-
gage] must be determined in accordance with local law."
34 it re Rand Mining Co., 71 F. Supp. 724, 727 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
85 The learned judge cited In re Boswell, 96 F. (2d) 239 (C.C.A. 9th 1939).
